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703 
WHAT WOULD GROTIUS DO? METHODS AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATING THE 
CONTRACT LAW DOCTRINE OF ILLUSORY 
PROMISES INTO THE LAW OF TREATY 
INTERPRETATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of North 
Korea (DPRK), along with four other nations,1 reached an agreement on 
September 19th, 2005, whereby the DPRK committed to abandon all 
nuclear weapons programs and return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.2 In response, the United States stated that it “has no intention to 
attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.”3 While 
agreements that reduce the threat of nuclear attack are desirable 
accomplishments, it appears that the United States and the four other 
parties did not actually give up anything in exchange for the DPRK 
abandoning its nuclear weapons program.4  
 
 
 1.  Six nations were involved in the negotiations that gave rise to this agreement: the United 
States, DPRK, Russia, China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks (Sept. 
19, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Under the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, it is generally 
considered a taking (therefore requiring compensation) when the government forces “some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The extent to which this principle should 
apply to countries suffering a detriment (such as abandonment of a nuclear program) for the good of 
the global community is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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Despite the often asserted maxim that all states have equal rights,5 a 
cursory review of history reveals a different story.6 While the more 
powerful nations often act (or purport to act) in the best interests of the 
global community, they frequently exploit their superior bargaining 
position to achieve their objectives.7 Although these inequalities are 
slowly disappearing, creating new methods of treaty interpretation could 
accelerate this process and ensure more equitable bargaining positions. 
Implementing the contract law requirement of consideration and the 
doctrine of illusory promises constitutes one possible approach to 
promoting equal bargaining power in the law of treaty interpretation. 
This Note addresses whether the doctrine of illusory promises is a 
desirable addition to the law of treaty interpretation by examining the 
general topography of modern international agreements, the history and 
judicial applications of the illusory promises doctrine, and the possible 
impact that the doctrine’s adoption would have on the field of international 
agreement interpretation. 
Section II provides relevant background information, including the 
current composition of international agreements, the role of contract law in 
interpreting international agreements, and a brief summary of the 
 
 
 5. The concept of equality features prominently in many seminal international agreements. 
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations (“U.N. Charter”) states that one purpose of the United 
Nations is “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples . . . .” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1031, T.S. No. 993. Article 2 of the U.N. Charter sets out the guiding principles to be followed in 
pursuit of the purposes contained in Article 1, including “1. The Organization is based on the principle 
of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Id. art. 2, para. 1. The Convention on Rights and Duties 
of States (Montevideo Convention) states:  
States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. 
The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, 
but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law. 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 4, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. The 
United States Supreme Court has also stated: “No principle of general law is more universally 
acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations.” The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 122, 
(1825). 
 6. See generally Werner Morvay, Unequal Treaties, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 514–17 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984) (discussing the extreme obligations 
Western nations forced upon China through a series of treaties in the name of promoting trade by 
virtue of superior military power); Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern 
International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567 (1995) (discussing unequal treaties between the U.S. 
and American Indian tribes made to promote further settlement by taking advantage of superior 
military power and concepts of treaties and ownership not familiar to the American Indians).  
 7. The U.N. Charter can be seen as an example of this, despite the assertion that all states have 
equal standing. The five permanent members of the Security Council are effectively able to overrule 
the majority of member states in most significant issues. See U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 24, para. 
1; Morvay, supra note 6, at 516. Thus, inequalities among states are enshrined in an institution 
supposedly dedicated to the equal rights of all nations.  
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consideration requirement of contract law. Section III addresses the 
possible methods for implementing consideration into the law governing 
international agreements, as well as arguments for and against this 
incorporation. Section IV discusses examples of other contract law 
doctrines used in international law. Finally, Section V presents two 
historical examples of international agreements and speculates how courts 
would rule on the validity of those agreements if consideration was 
required. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Composition of International Agreements 
The modern conception of the nation-state, and consequently the 
modern conception of international law, began with the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648.8 Today, international agreements vary widely, 
ranging from minor trade negotiations to massive, near-universal treaties 
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.9 The 
growing number of such agreements has led many to question the 
significance of these agreements and to what extent they actually bind 
states.10  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) 
has become the definitive source for interpreting treaty law since it entered 
 
 
 8. The Peace of Westphalia, reprinted in 1 Consol. T.S. 198. Two legal scholars state that the 
Peace of Westphalia “is for many historians and lawyers the real beginning of the era of ‘modern 
international relations’ and hence of ‘modern international law.’” MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 27 (2d ed. 2001).  
 9. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. As of 
April 8, 2007, 153 of the 191 U.N. member countries have signed the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Chronological Lists of Ratifications, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the 
Related Agreements, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ 
ratifications.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
 10. Thus, state sovereignty is both the basis of international law and the cause of its major 
weakness. The principle of a state’s sovereignty is that there is no power over the state’s population 
held by anyone else. One of the first to develop this theory of sovereignty was Jean Bodin. JANIS & 
NOYES, supra note 8, at 401. In his treatise, Bodin stated “Maietie or Soueraigntie is the moft high, 
abfolute, and perpetuall power over the citifens and fubjects in a Commonweale . . . .” JEAN BODIN, 
THE SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE, Book I, ch. 8 (Kenneth Douglas McRae ed., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1962) (1576). There is no higher power than the state, therefore the only enforcement 
mechanism for international law is a state’s consent to be bound. Some argue this indicates that states 
will only abide by international law when it is in their favor. See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The False 
Promise of International Institutions, INT’L SEC., Winter 1994–1995, at 5, 9–12 (asserting that states 
make decisions about compliance with international law solely in terms of whether compliance will tilt 
the balance of power in their favor). 
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into force on January 27, 1980.11 Article 2 of the Vienna Convention 
defines “treaty” as “an international agreement concluded between States 
in written form and governed by international law . . . .”12  
The realm of treaty law can be divided into three broad categories: 
those establishing international organizations, such as the Charter of the 
United Nations (U.N. Charter);13 those governing individual interactions, 
such as the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad;14 and those 
establishing a quid pro quo agreement between states, such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement.15  
A rough analogy can be drawn between these three types of 
international agreements and three types of traditional domestic law.16 
Treaties establishing international organizations can be compared to 
constitutional law.17 Treaties governing individual interactions can be 
 
 
 11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 The Vienna Convention opened for signature in 1969, but it required 35 ratifications before it 
would enter into force. Id. art. 84. While it has never been applied as a treaty governing treaties, given 
that both parties to the governed treaty must also be parties to the Vienna Convention, it is widely 
regarded as an authoritative restatement of the customary international law regarding treaty 
interpretation. James R. Crawford, Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole, 8 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 310 (2001).  
 12. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 2, para. 1(a). This definition includes international 
agreements even if they are not formally called treaties. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States lists many of the other names carried by documents which fall 
under this definition:  
Among the terms used are: treaty, convention, agreement, protocol, covenant, charter, statute, 
act, declaration, concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, 
memoradum of understanding, and modus vivendi. Whatever their designation, all agreements 
have the same legal status, except as their provisions or the circumstances of their conclusion 
indicate otherwise. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 301 cmt. a (1987). 
 While the Vienna Convention definition is used for this Note, there is some indication that the 
requirement of an agreement between states is weakening. For example, Scotland is a constituent 
country of the United Kingdom without traditional foreign relations powers. Govern Pub.com, 
Scotland, http://www.governpub.com/Capitals-S/Scotland.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). However, in 
November of 2005, Scotland signed an agreement with Malawi to provide aid and teachers to the 
impoverished African nation. Malawi President Hails Scots Link (Nov. 2, 2005), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/4398116.stm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
 13. See U.N. Charter, supra note 5. 
 14. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for 
signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 37. 
 15. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 
2057 (1993). Most international agreements probably fall into this category (hence its importance). 
 16. See generally Detleve F. Vagts, Treaty Interpretation and the New American Ways of Law 
Reading, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 472 (1993). 
 17. Id. at 475. Both areas deal with creating the structure and powers of entities exerting 
influence over the others. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/20
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analyzed using legislative law.18 Finally, treaties pertaining to quid pro 
quo arrangements resemble contract law. 19 The latter type of treaty, 
treaties pertaining to quid pro quo arrangements, are the focus of this 
Note. 
B. Contract Law’s Role in Interpreting International Law 
Given the nature of these treaties, it is not surprising that contract law, 
rather than legislative or constitutional law, has often been consulted when 
interpreting quid pro quo agreements.20 Both contracts and quid pro quo 
treaties involve two or more parties who each exchange commitments.21  
Numerous provisions within the Vienna Convention closely resemble 
traditional contract law.22 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that 
terms in a treaty should be interpreted according to their ordinary 
meaning.23 Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the 
general rule that unless the parties had a different intent, words should be 
construed to have their common meaning.24  
Further, the doctrine of separability exists in both treaty and contract 
law. Article 44 of the Vienna Convention addresses separability of treaty 
provisions.25 It states that a country cannot seek to invalidate only one 
clause of a treaty while retaining the rest unless: the clause in question is 
separable from the rest of the treaty; the clause to be invalidated was not 
an essential part of the treaty; or performance of the remainder of the 
treaty would not be unjust.26 Similarly, separate provisions of a contract 
 
 
 18. Id. Both areas deal with the rules (outside of common law) constraining action by citizens. 
See id. at 498–501. 
 19. Id. at 475. Both areas deal with an exchange of promises or actions in exchange for a return 
promise or action. See id. at 501–03.  
 20. See id. at 491–506 (discussing different approaches to treaty interpretation depending upon 
the nature of the treaty).  
 21. Id. at 501–03.  
 22. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31. 
 23. Id. “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose . . . .” Id. art. 
31 (1).  
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3) (1981). “Unless a different intention is 
manifested, (a) where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with 
that meaning; (b) technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning when used in a 
transaction within their technical field.” Id. 
 25. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 44. 
 26. Id.  
1. A right of a party, provided for in a treaty or arising under article 56, to denounce, 
withdraw from or suspend the operation of the treaty may be exercised only with respect to 
the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree. 
2. A ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cannot be invalidated unless it can be shown that the contract contains 
corresponding pairs of promised performances.27  
The doctrine of waiver is also present in both treaty and contract law. 
Article 45 of the Vienna Convention provides that parties to a treaty may 
no longer invoke a ground for invalidating a treaty if, after the event 
underlying the grounds for invalidation, the parties expressly agreed the 
treaty was still valid, or if their subsequent actions may be considered as 
acquiescence.28 This provision is nearly identical to the doctrine of waiver 
from contract law, which requires a party to perform under a contract if 
they have promised to do so after the other party fails to perform.29  
The article of the Vienna Convention most closely resembling contract 
law is Article 60.30 This article addresses termination of treaties as a 
consequence of breach and states that a material breach by one party 
entitles another party to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the 
treaty.31 The article goes on to define a material breach as (among other 
 
 
treaty recognized in the present Convention may be invoked only with respect to the whole 
treaty except as provided in the following paragraphs or in article 60. 
3. If the ground relates solely to particular clauses, it may be invoked only with respect to 
those clauses where: 
 (a) the said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their 
application; 
 (b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that acceptance of those clauses 
was not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty 
as a whole; and 
 (c) continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not be unjust. 
Id. 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (1981).  
If the performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises can be apportioned into 
corresponding pairs of part performances so that the parts of each pair are properly regarded 
as agreed equivalents, a party’s performance of his part of such a pair has the same effect on 
the other’s duties to render performance of the agreed equivalent as it would have if only that 
pair of performances had been promised.  
Id. 
 28. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 45.  
A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminationg, withdrawing from or 
suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 and 62 if, after 
becoming aware of the facts: 
 (a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or continues 
in operation, as the case may be; or 
 (b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of 
the treaty . . . .” 
Id. 
 29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1981). “(1) Except as stated in Subsection 
(2), a promise to perform all or part of a conditional duty under an antecedent contract in spite of the 
non-occurrence of the condition is binding . . . .” Id. 
 30. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 60. 
 31. Id. “1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss3/20
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things) a violation of a provision essential to the treaty.32 The language 
used in the Vienna Convention is similar to the terminology most often 
used to describe a party’s power to terminate a contract due to another 
party’s failure to perform.33  
Finally, a state’s ability to suspend a treaty due to a subsequent 
fundamental change in circumstances under Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention is substantially similar to the doctrine of frustration of purpose 
in contract law. Article 62 allows a party to a treaty to terminate or 
withdraw from a treaty if a change occurs which is fundamental to the 
original terms of the treaty and which greatly alters the obligations of a 
party.34 Similarly, under contract law, the frustration of purpose doctrine 
states that if the fundamental reason for a contract is removed, even if it is 
outside the control of either party, the parties are no longer bound by the 
contract.35 
Given that the Vienna Convention is the primary authority on the 
interpretation of treaties36 and the similarity between many Vienna 
Convention provisions to contract law, it is reasonable to conclude that 
contract law plays a valuable role in the interpretation of treaties. 
Furthermore, additional contract law doctrines may be useful in 
solidifying the law of treaties. 
 
 
the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.” Id. 
art. 60(1). 
 32. Id. art. 60(3)(a)–(b). “3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists 
in: (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or (b) the violation of a 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty . . . .” Id. 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981). “In determining whether a failure to 
render or to offer performance is material, the following circumstances are significant: (a) the extent to 
which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected . . . .” Id. 
 34. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 62.  
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at 
the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be 
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:  
 (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of 
the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 
 (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be 
performed under the treaty. 
Id. art. 62(1). 
 35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).  
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without 
his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, 
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary. 
Id. 
 36. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. The Doctrine of Illusory Promises 
In U.S. contract law there are three basic elements to any contract: 
there must be an offer, an acceptance, and consideration.37 The doctrine of 
illusory promises is one method the courts use to enforce the requirement 
of consideration in contracts.38 It is used to invalidate contracts where one 
party has not actually bound itself to do anything.39 The traditional 
example of an illusory promise is “I will give you ten dollars if I feel like 
it.”40  
Courts have traditionally taken two approaches in applying this 
doctrine.41 The first, more classical approach, is to find the contract void 
for lack of consideration.42 The more modern approach is for the courts to 
read objective standards into a potential illusory promise.43  
These two approaches result in opposite outcomes, but the essential 
principle remains the same: a contract is not binding upon the parties 
unless each gives up something of value in exchange for the bargain. 
 
 
 37. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (2004). Offer is 
commonly defined as “a manifestation to another of assent to enter into a contract if the other 
manifests assent in return by some action, often a promise but sometimes a performance.” Id. at 204. 
Farnsworth defines acceptance as “the action (promise or performance) by the offeree that creates a 
contract (i.e., makes the offeror’s promise enforceable).” Id. This Note focuses on the requirement of 
consideration. Contract law includes many methods for finding an offer and acceptance, which is not a 
problem under treaty law. The requirement that a treaty be in written form under the Vienna 
Convention effectively satisfies the offer and acceptance components of a contract, because the 
obligations of each party are reduced to writing and the consent of each state is clearly shown through 
the ratification process.  
 While there are several different interpretations of consideration, one time-honored view is that it 
requires the promisor to undergo some detriment or to confer some benefit on the other party. Id. at 78. 
In other words, one must give something of value in return for something of value, otherwise the 
agreement is a mere gift and typically not an enforceable contract. See id. at 85–86. The Restatement 
of Contracts explains that “[a] proposal of a gift is not an offer within the present definition; there must 
be an element of exchange. Whether or not a proposal is a promise, it is not an offer unless it specifies 
a promise or performance by the offeree as the price or consideration to be given by him.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 cmt. a (1981). Because there is no element of exchange 
to a gift, it lacks the essential elements of a contract. FARNSWORTH, supra, n.6.  
 38. FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, at 133. 
 39. Most commonly, this doctrine is used as an affirmative defense when the illusory promisor 
attempts to enforce a promise made by the other party. Id. at 134.  
 40. See id. at 133. 
 41. Id. at 133–34. 
 42. Without consideration, an essential element of the contract is missing. Id. Thus, neither party 
is bound to perform their promised agreements because there is no actual contract. Id. 
 43. FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, at 134–36. Courts are increasingly unwilling to find contracts 
void, and instead will read language amounting to “I will if I feel like it” to include whether a 
reasonable person in an identical situation would “feel like it.” See id. at 136. For example, if a 
contract allows a party to terminate it if costs of remediation are “unreasonable,” the court will 
interpret “unreasonable” to be what a person acting in good faith would deem unreasonable. See, e.g., 
Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 707 A.2d 1072 (N.J. Super. 1998).  
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III. INCORPORATING THE DOCTRINE OF ILLUSORY PROMISES INTO 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
A. Methods of Incorporation 
Before the doctrine of illusory promises can have any influence on 
treaties, it must be accepted into the body of international law. This is a 
difficult task given that no authoritative listing of what constitutes 
international law exists.44 However, Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is often referenced as a source for 
determining what is included in international law.45  
The requirement of consideration and the doctrine of illusory promises 
could be incorporated into the established law of international agreements 
 
 
 44. For various viewpoints on what constitutes the body of international law, see generally 
Andrew T. Guzman, Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002) 
(examining international law from the perspective of compliance); Stephan Hobe, The Era of 
Globalisation as a Challenge to International Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 655 (2002) (discussing the 
development of international law since 1648 and possible new sources of international law in an era of 
globalization); A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J. OF 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1475 (2003) (discussing the U.S. courts’ approach to determining the content of 
customary international law). 
 45. Article 38 sets out the components of international law which the ICJ may consider when 
hearing cases. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 
No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. ICJ may also consider explicit agreements made between states 
establishing rules of conduct, as long as those states are parties to the dispute at hand. ICJ Statute Art. 
38 (1)(a) (permitting the application of international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states). This area of the law would include 
any treaties signed by both parties to a dispute. Supplementing these definite agreements is general 
international custom. ICJ Statute Art. 38 (1)(b). International custom can be found by looking at 
“general practice accepted as law.” Id. However, this definition leaves room for interpretation and 
there is a significant amount of dispute over what constitutes a “general practice accepted as law.” 
International custom is generally recognized when 1) there is sufficiently uniform state practice and 2) 
states follow the custom out of a sense of obligation. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International 
Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 536 (1993). Other than these two amorphous criteria, there is no definite 
time which must pass before custom is established. Id. Closely related are the “general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations.” ICJ Statute art. 38 (1)(c). The term “civilized” is generally no 
longer given much weight. The ICJ Statute was adopted entirely from the establishing statute of the 
PCIJ. MOHAMED SAMEH M. AMR, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS THE 
PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS 20 (2003). Thus, some terms which were in 
common usage in 1920 when the PCIJ’s statute was written no longer fit. The ICJ will recognize 
general principles of law if there are a large number of states with similar laws. See The AM&S Case, 
[1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264 (In finding that the principle of confidential communications between lawyer 
and client was a general principle of law, the court examined most of the domestic legal systems of 
Europe, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece. The court found 
that since every system had a similar law, it should be recognized as a general principle of law.) 
Finally, judges may also consider judicial decisions and “highly qualified” publications from various 
nations as subsidiary sources. ICJ Statute art. 38 (1)(d). Strictly speaking, Article 38 is only an 
instruction to ICJ judges about which sources may be consulted; however, it is often regarded as a 
listing of the sources of international law. JANIS & NOYES, supra note 8, at 21. 
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through any of Article 38’s provisions.46 The most unlikely avenue of 
incorporation would be under Article 38(1)(a), international conventions, 
which would require an amendment to the Vienna Convention itself.47 
While this would give the most weight to the doctrine,48 it would also be 
extremely difficult to amend a Convention with so many signatories.49 
Due to Article 40, every state which is a party must be notified and has a 
right to participate in negotiations surrounding a proposed amendment 
before the Vienna Convention can be amended.50 Finally, every party to 
the treaty must agree to the amendment.51  
Recognition of the doctrine’s status as international customary law 
would also pose significant problems. There is no indication that states 
require consideration for the formation of international agreements.52 
Since there is no state practice, there can be no opinio juris and hence no 
international custom. However, if states began requiring definite 
commitments, it might be possible to establish consideration for 
international agreements as custom.53  
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides another 
possible answer.54 Section 102 discusses sources of international law and 
notes that general principles common to the major legal systems can be 
 
 
 46. While Article 38 sets out the categories of international law, there are no set rules regarding 
what subject matter each category can contain. Thus, so long as the doctrine of illusory promises met 
the usage requirements for adoption as part of the body of international law, it could fall into any 
category. See generally ICJ Statute art. 38. 
 47. James R. Crawford, supra note 11, at 310. 
 48. Treaty obligations are one of the few sources of international law besides jus cogens norms 
which are compulsory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1987) § 102 cmts. f–k. 
 49. Currently, there are 45 signatories and 108 parties to the Vienna Convention. United Nations 
Treaty Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2007). 
 50. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 40. 
 51. Id. However, there is some indication that if a sufficient number of states accepted the 
amendment, it could be considered a part of customary international law. See generally ICJ Statute, 
supra note 45; text accompanying note 45 (outlining the requirements for acceptance as international 
custom). Given that the doctrine does not exist in international law at the present time, even the 
lengthy amendment process would fail to bring the doctrine into common usage. 
 52. In fact, there is some indication that consideration is not essential to international contracts. 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, http://www.unidroit.org/english/ 
principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf (last visited February 2, 2006). Article 3.2 
states that “a contract is concluded, modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the parties, 
without any further requirement.” Id. art. 3.2. Comment 1 explains that the common law requirement 
of consideration “is of minimal practical importance since in that context (commercial dealings) 
obligations are almost always undertaken by both parties.” Id. at cmt. 1. 
 53. See ICJ Statute, supra note 45, and accompanying text (asserting that there is no time 
requirement before a law is considered international custom). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1987). 
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considered supplemental to other sources.55 This is probably the most 
likely avenue for incorporation. However, there are still several obstacles, 
including the Restatement’s own lack of authority,56 the question of what 
constitutes a general principle of law, and whether the doctrine of illusory 
promises can be considered common to the major legal systems.57 
The most practical solution is to incorporate the requirement of 
consideration as an equitable solution rather than as an explicit legal 
principle.58 Equity is not explicitly mentioned as a source of law in the 
section of the statute of the ICJ dealing with international law.59 However, 
the ICJ has repeatedly turned to equity in deciding a variety of cases.60 
Other international courts have similarly relied upon equity in reaching 
their decisions.61  
Any attempt to officially incorporate the doctrine would face 
significant challenges. In The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ 
indicated an unwillingness to declare new principles of international law 
as opposed to declarations that merely “embody or crystallize” pre-
existing customary law.62 Since there is little evidence that the doctrine of 
illusory promises could be considered customary law,63 the court will 
likely be unwilling to recognize the doctrine unless it is asserted in the 
form of equity. 
 
 
 55. Id. § 102(4). 
 56. Restatements are generally only persuasive to U.S. law. While courts may consider the works 
of eminent scholars (see sources section), such works are not binding. Id. at Foreword. 
 57. The foreword to the Restatement (Third) explains that “The formulation of legal rules in a 
Restatement is the considered opinion of the American Law Institute. As was said of the prior 
Restatement, it is ‘in no sense an official document of the United States.’” Id. 
 58. In addition to equity, there is one more body of law not explicity mentioned in Article 38: jus 
cogens. Jus Cogens is regarded as a compulsory source of international law binding states. SIR IAN 
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 207–09 (2d ed. 1984). It is extremely 
unlikely that the doctrine of illusory promises could be considered jus cogens, as only the most 
extreme crimes fall into this category, such as genocide, piracy, and perhaps torture. Id. at 215. In 
addition, this aspect of international law is compulsory and thus violates the principle of sovereignty. 
See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 8. Thus, it is extremely controversial. SINCLAIR, supra, at 207.  
 59. See ICJ Statute art. 38. 
 60. See The Meuse Case, 1937 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 70 (relying on principles of equity to deny 
The Netherlands a judgment preventing Belgium from pumping lock water in breach of a treaty when 
the Netherlands was guilty of the same breach); The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. 
Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (using equity in determining which methods should be used to set 
the territorial boundaries of the North Sea). 
 61. The Cayuga Indians Case, Nielsen Reports 203, 307 (1926). (The arbitrator turned to 
principles of equity in order to award a portion of payments due under a US-Indian treaty to Cayuga 
Indians living in Canada, despite the fact that the tribe’s supposed representatives were located in New 
York). 
 62. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 3, para. 69. 
 63. See ICJ Statute (setting out the requirements for customary law). 
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In practice, if this doctrine were to be incorporated, it would probably 
take on a role similar to the one it plays in contract law. For example, if 
one state sought to enforce a treaty against another state (possibly by 
exerting political pressure, or increasingly by bringing a case before an 
international tribunal, such as the ICJ), and if the defendant state felt that 
the plaintiff had exacted commitments without making any real promise in 
return, the defendant state could raise an affirmative defense that the treaty 
was unenforceable because each side had not made a commitment. If the 
tribunal finds that the state seeking enforcement has not made a real 
promise in return for the defendant state’s commitment, it could render the 
treaty unenforceable.  
B. Arguments in Favor of Incorporation 
Incorporating the doctrine of illusory promises would reduce the vast 
disparity in bargaining power between strong and weak states in the 
modern international hierarchy.64 It is true that the relevant documents 
defining states and governing their interactions do not mention any 
specific hierarchy.65 In fact, the preamble to the U.N. Charter contains 
language asserting that all states have equal rights.66 However, throughout 
the history of the modern nation–state it is clear that all states have not 
been treated equally. This inequality has manifested itself in an overt form, 
such as the past requirement that states be recognized by the “civilized” 
states.67 It can also be seen in a more subtle form by examining treaties 
between powerful states and weaker ones.  
If the doctrine of illusory promises was used in evaluating international 
agreements, it would prevent the predation of stronger states on weaker 
ones.  
 
 
 64. The eight largest economies in the world in terms of GDP (the United States, the European 
Union, China, Japan, India, Germany, the United Kingdom and France) produce well over half the 
world’s GDP. Rank Order—GDP, The CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). 
 65. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, concluded in 1933, 
defines a state as possessing “a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states. See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 
supra note 5, art. 1.  
 66. The preamble states “We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith 
. . . in the equal rights . . . of nations large and small.” U.N. Charter, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 67. At the turn of the century, British scholar Lassa Oppenheim asserted that “a new State before 
its recognition cannot claim any right which a member of the Family of Nations has towards other 
members.” 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law § 71 (1905). This view has since fallen to the 
modern perception outlined in The Montevideo Convention, which states that “[t]he political existence 
of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.” 49 Stat. 3097 art. 3. 
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In addition, incorporating the doctrine of illusory promises would 
clarify a country’s obligations under a treaty. Explicit language and 
promises would be required, thereby making it easier to determine when a 
country was in breach of its obligations. By requiring definite 
commitments, any agreement reached would be more likely to result in 
actual change. This would add legitimacy to international law and dispel 
the notion that it does not have much effect on the way states behave.  
C. Arguments Against Incorporation 
While it may be true that there is a distinct power divide between 
developed and developing nations, implementing the doctrine of illusory 
promises as a piecemeal attempt to remedy this inequality may be 
counterproductive. Simply because a difference in influence exists 
between countries does not mean that every agreement they reach is 
unfair. The rule of law prevails in the majority of international 
interactions, and states are seldom in a position to coerce one another into 
unfavorable agreements. 
Attempting to incorporate the doctrine of illusory promises into treaty 
law could be significantly detrimental for several reasons. First, while the 
doctrine is recognized in the U.S., not all countries utilize it in their 
domestic law. While few rules of law must be universally accepted to be 
deemed international custom, there must at least be a significant number 
of countries subscribing to the proposed law.68 It would be extremely risky 
to rest the fate of one’s case on such a tenuous premise, and if a party had 
a better argument, the court would likely accept that argument before 
deciding to recognize the doctrine. 
Applying the doctrine of illusory promises would also make it more 
difficult to enter into international agreements. By preventing general 
statements of intent from being a valid promise, it would require states to 
make more concrete statements such as “The United States will not invade 
North Korea so long as it abides by all international agreements and 
refrains from hostile actions.” This language is much stronger than general 
statements of intent, and any state, especially the U.S., may be reluctant to 
make such a commitment.69 Since agreements incorporating the doctrine 
 
 
 68. In determining whether the principle of lawyer-client confidentiality should be included in 
customary law, the European Court of Justice examined the municipal laws of several of the European 
Union’s central members. Upon finding that lawyer-client communications were afforded some degree 
of confidentiality in most E.U. countries, the court ruled that such communications should be 
considered privileged as part of international law. The AM&S Case, (1982) 2 C.M.L.R. 264. 
 69. The United States has been consistently reluctant to enter into international agreements 
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would require deeper commitments, such requirements would reduce the 
number of agreements. Therefore, if the primary goal is to increase 
international interaction, incorporating the doctrine of illusory promises 
may reduce the number of such interactions and become a detriment to the 
evolution of international law. 
Apart from merely reducing the number of agreements, incorporation 
of this doctrine may threaten the legitimacy of international law. If cases 
were brought before the ICJ against a country which the ICJ did not think 
would abide by a ruling, it is possible that the ICJ would find a legal 
contrivance in order to avoid hearing the case. This occurred in The 
South–West Africa Cases during the 1960s.70 Those rulings seriously 
jeopardized the legitimacy of the court, because it was widely recognized 
that the ICJ had refused to acknowledge that the parties had a legal claim, 
despite an earlier decision that the parties had standing. The presumed 
reason was that the court was sure that South Africa would not abide by an 
adverse ruling. The court was unwilling to decide a case that could not be 
enforced. There are, however, also examples where countries abide by 
decisions in international disputes, despite a severe present detriment, such 
as Libya’s decision to pay Texaco $76 million in crude oil in 
compensation for Libya’s nationalization of the oil company’s assets.71  
While powerful countries are those more likely to make illusory 
promises in exchange for promises from lesser countries, the same 
powerful countries are also less likely to abide by rulings of international 
courts. Thus, if the ICJ did adopt the doctrine, it would most likely be 
 
 
which it feels would unduly constrain its domestic and international actions, such as the Kyoto 
Protocols and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
 70. Ethiopia and Liberia sought to enforce several provisions of the League of Nations Mandate 
which South Africa maintained for southwest Africa. Despite an earlier court ruling that both Ethiopia 
and Liberia had standing, in 1966 the ICJ ruled that neither party had a legal right or interest because 
South Africa’s duty to issue reports was to the League of Nations, not individual members. Ethiopia v. 
South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 325, 166 WL 2, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3dp2=3&code=esadcase=46dk=c1 (last visited Aug. 21, 2007). 
Commentators have observed that “[i]t might have been disastrous for the Court to reach the merits yet 
see its decision ignored by the major powers who alone were capable of compelling South Africa’s 
compliance through Security Council action.” Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World 
Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 399, 413 
(1997). Since 1966, the ICJ has ruled against major powers and seen its decisions respected, so this 
may be less of a concern today. See The Elsi Case (U.S. v. Ital.) 1989 I.C.J. 15 (where the ICJ ruled 
against the United States in its claim that Italy had violated a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation [FCN Treaty] by seizing a manufacturing plant owned by the U.S. defense contractor 
Raytheon); The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3. 
But see The Rainbow Warrior Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 82 I.L.P. 500 (in which France ignored provisions of 
a previous arbitration provision). 
 71. The Texaco/Libya Arbitration, Jan. 19, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 1. 
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invoked to prevent powerful countries from exacting treaty obligations 
from weaker ones. If these countries did not abide by the ICJ’s rulings, 
incorporating the doctrine would hurt the legitimacy of the court and 
perhaps cause a setback in the development and respect of international 
law.72 
IV. OTHER CONTRACT DOCTRINES IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
A. Doctrine of Frustration/Impossibility of Performance 
In the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary 
relied on several provisions of the Vienna Convention that closely 
resemble contract law in an attempt to terminate a treaty concluded with 
the former Czechoslovakia.73 Hungary claimed it was not bound by the 
treaty due to the impossibility of performance doctrine.74 Impossibility of 
performance, while considered to be part of customary international law,75 
is restated in Article 61 of the Vienna Convention.76  
This is similar to the impossibility doctrine in U.S. contract law. Under 
the impossibility doctrine, if, for example, total failure of a wheat crop 
occurred due to unforeseen diseases, it would be impossible for a nation to 
supply grain according to the terms of a treaty, as the farmer could not 
even supply a buyer. This impossibility would absolve the party to the 
contract from their obligation. In this case, the court refused to find 
Hungary protected by the doctrine since it was possible to complete the 
 
 
 72. International law is based on consent. The ICJ has no jurisdiction except when the states 
involved both accept that jurisdiction. (ICJ Statute art. 36). In addition, after the ICJ has made its 
ruling, there is no enforcement mechanism through the ICS itself. AMR, supra note 45, at 38. 
Typically, the ICJ has relied on mobilization of shame (the embarrassment a country suffers in front of 
the international community if it ignores the UN) to ensure compliance. Oscar Schachter et. al., 
Compliance and Enforcement in the United Nations System, 85 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 428, 437 
(1991). However, as more countries are subjected to this approach, its effectiveness diminishes.  
 73. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 3. 
 74. Id at para. 102. 
 75. Id at para. 99. 
 76. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 61. 
1. A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from it, if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or 
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is 
temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.  
2. Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating, 
withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a 
breach by that party either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international 
obligation owed to any other party to the treaty. 
 Id.  
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essence of the treaty, because an “economic joint investment consistent 
with environmental protection and which was operated by the two 
contracting parties jointly,” could still be fulfilled.77 
Hungary also argued that there had been such a shift in circumstances 
(such as changes in the political climate, diminishing economic viability of 
the project, increased environmental knowledge, and changed international 
norms that the treaty should be rendered invalid under the doctrine of 
fundamental change in circumstances, or rebus sic stantibus).78 This 
doctrine is also recognized as customary international law and is embodied 
in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention.79 After reviewing the evidence, 
the court found that the changes cited did not amount to a fundamental 
change in circumstances, as they did not fundamentally affect the original 
purpose of the treaty.80 
B. First Material Breacher: The Meuse Case 
In The Meuse Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(“PCIJ”)81 used equity principles to deny the Netherlands relief in its claim 
against Belgium over a lock and pumping system.82 The court reasoned 
that since the Netherlands had a lock causing the same problems as the 
Belgian lock, and the Dutch lock had been put into operation first, it would 
not be just to allow the Netherlands to enforce a treaty it had broken first.83 
The equity principles cited by the court are almost identical to the first 
material breacher doctrine.84 In contract law, if one party breaches an 
agreement, that party cannot bring suit against another party to the contract 
for a subsequent breach.85 This principle is also embodied in Article 60 of 
the Vienna Convention.86 
 
 
 77. Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 3 at para. 103. 
 78. Id. at para. 104. 
 79. Id.; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 62. 
 80. Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 3 at para. 155. 
 81. The PCIJ is the precursor to the ICJ. It was formed under the League of Nations and 
functioned as the judicial arm of that body. When the ICJ was created through the United Nations 
Charter, most of its defining statutory language was taken directly from the PCIJ statute. 
 82. The Meuse Case, 1937 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 70, at 23–24. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, at 509–12. 
 86. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 60. 
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V. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF ILLUSORY PROMISES TO SELECTED 
CASES 
After studying the background of modern international agreement law, 
instances where contract law doctrines have been used in interpreting 
international agreements, and the history of the doctrine of illusory 
promises, this Note now examines how the ICJ (or PCIJ) might have ruled 
if these doctrines had been incorporated into the law of treaty 
interpretation when the cases were decided. 
A. The Eastern Greenland Case 
The Eastern Greenland Case came before the PCIJ in 1933.87 This case 
involved a dispute between Denmark and Norway, in which the former 
claimed that the latter had violated an agreement by objecting to 
Denmark’s claim to all of Greenland.88 The Danish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs reported that “the Danish Government . . . is prepared to reply that 
Denmark has no interests in Spitzbergen, and that it has no reason to 
oppose the wishes of Norway in regard to the settlement of this 
question.”89 The Danish government then expressed the hope that Norway 
would not interfere with Danish claims to all of Greenland.90 The 
Norwegian Minister later replied that “the Norwegian Government would 
not make any difficulties in the settlement of this question (Danish claims 
to Greenland).”91 When Norway later tried to assert that Eastern 
Greenland should be controlled by Norway given that Norwegian settlers 
occupied the area, Denmark brought suit before the PCIJ to enforce 
Norway’s commitment not to interfere with Danish claims to 
sovereignty.92  
The court found that Norway was obligated not to contest Denmark’s 
claims to Eastern Greenland.93 If the court had implemented the doctrine 
 
 
 87. The Eastern Greenland Case (Den. v. Nor.) 1933 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B) No. 53, at 22.  
 88. Id. at 44. After World War I, numerous shifts in boundaries occurred. During the peace 
conference at Versailles, a committee was formed to determine which country should be able to lay 
claim to Spitzbergen. Id. at 55–57. Spitzbergen is an archipelago in the Arctic Ocean north of Norway. 
Svalbard, CIA World Factbook available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
geos/sv.html (last accessed Oct. 17, 2007).  
 89. The Eastern Greenland Case, 1933 P.C.I.J. No. 53, at 69–70. 
 90. Id. at 70. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 28. 
 93. Id. at 73. The Court reasoned that the statement by Norway’s Foreign Minister was binding 
upon Norway because it was a response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign 
nation to a specific individual who had authority to make commitments on such matters. Id. at 71.  
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of illusory promises, however, it could have reached two different 
conclusions, depending upon the approach used.94 If it took the traditional 
approach, it would have found that Norway was under no obligation not to 
interfere with Denmark’s claims to Greenland. For there to be an 
agreement, there must be mutual assent to an exchange and 
consideration.95 
The Danish minister’s words did not constitute a binding promise 
because, while he stated what Denmark was prepared to do, he did not 
manifest any commitment that Denmark would indeed forego its 
objections. Because Denmark did not make a binding promise, there was 
no bargain. Therefore Norway could not be bound by its promise and 
would be allowed to maintain its objection to Denmark’s assertion of 
sovereignty over Eastern Greenland.  
However, if the court applied the modern approach, it would likely 
have interpreted the exchange to contain unstated objective criteria and 
found that Norway was still bound not to object to the sovereignty claim. 
If the court had followed this approach, it might have determined that the 
language “is prepared to reply” bound Denmark not to object unless in 
good faith there was a reason not to continue for the agreement. 
B. The September 19th Joint Statement 
As previously stated, the U.S., DPRK, Russia, China, ROK, and Japan 
reached an agreement on September 19, which included the phrase “The 
United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean 
Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear 
or conventional weapons.”96 
This statement can be construed as an illusory promise because the first 
part, pertaining to nuclear weapons, is merely a statement of fact and does 
not impose any obligation on the U.S. not to introduce nuclear weapons in 
the future.97 The second part is equally illusory, since while at the time of 
signing there may have been no intent to invade, the U.S. could still mount 
an attack the next day if it so chose, arguing that intentions had changed. 
These statements would take the form of binding promises if small 
modifications, such as the U.S. making any transfer of nuclear weapons 
 
 
 94. See Part II.C of this Note for an explanation of the two methods of applying the doctrine of 
illusory promises. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 2.13. 
 95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. e (1981). 
 96. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 2. 
 97. Contract law is generally only concerned with promises or actions in the future. 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 37, § 1.1. 
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public or manifesting an intent not to invade so long as no hostile actions, 
were made to the agreement.  
If another party to this agreement refused to follow its obligations, as 
indeed the DPRK has by refusing to give up its nuclear weapons program 
without first being given a light water reactor, the U.S. might not be able 
to enforce the agreement because its “promises” do not constitute an 
obligation and therefore the U.S. cannot demand the promise made in 
consideration for its illusory promises be fulfilled. 
If the U.S. did bring a case against the DPRK before the ICJ for 
breaching the September 19th agreement, the court could take two 
approaches.98 First, it could take the more traditional approach and deem 
the entire agreement unenforceable because of a lack of consideration. The 
court would therefore rule that the U.S. did not make a definite 
commitment and therefore there was no valid agreement. Second, the court 
could take the modern approach and interpret the U.S.’s statement that it 
“has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or 
conventional weapons” to contain some sort of reasonableness or good 
faith standard. Thus, should the U.S. attack or invade the DPRK, they 
would have to show some reasonable or good faith reason that the 
previous peaceful intent changed. The objective standards would limit the 
behavior of the U.S., making the promise binding. The court would then 
hold that the agreement had all the necessary components for enforcement 
and could hold against the DPRK.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Historically, stronger states have prevailed over weaker ones. While 
this trend has taken many forms, from the Romans conquering their 
neighbors to the requirement that a state be civilized and recognized 
before being admitted into the international community, this hierarchy 
seems to be persistent throughout history.99  
Recently, the international community has started moving away from 
this trend. Following the U.N. Charter’s declaration that all states have 
equal rights100 and the disappearance of the discriminatory policy of 
 
 
 98. See supra note 94. 
 99. For a summary of Rome’s influence on neighboring states, see HISTORY OF THE ROMAN 
EMPIRE FROM THE DEATH OF MARCUS AURELIUS TO THE ACCESSION OF GORDIAN III (Edward C. 
Echols, trans., University of California Press 1961). Surviving treaties with Rome indicate that it was 
able to extract significant concessions from other groups. See 1 Maccabees 8:1-29 (describing a peace 
treaty between the Jews and Romans whereby the Jews agreed to give aid if Rome was attacked). 
 100. U.N. Charter, supra note 5, pmbl.  
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recognition, some scholars argue that states now have more equal footing 
on the global diplomatic stage.101 This trend could be furthered by 
incorporating the doctrine of illusory promises into the laws of treaty 
interpretation in order to limit the ability of powerful states to exact 
concessions from weaker states in exchange for vague commitments.  
If treaties could be invalidated under this doctrine, international 
agreements would be more likely to contain meaningful commitments by 
each side. However, more stringent requirements would also likely result 
in fewer agreements. If fewer, more significant international agreements 
are desired, the doctrine of illusory promises should be incorporated into 
treaty law. However, if more international commitments are desired, 
regardless of their enforceability, the doctrine should not be accepted.  
Justin Lowe∗ 
 
 
 101. JANIS & NOYES, supra note 8, at 403. 
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